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Italy, a history of large public debt
Italy has the third largest stock of public debt in the world, the second
in the euro zone next to Greece and the highest debt service ratio in
the G7.
The last point is particularly important to understand the difficulties of
managing Italian public debt. Japan holds roughly twice of the Italian
public debt, but it spends less than one percent of GDP to service its
public debt while Italy spends 5.4 percent of GDP.
The burden of interest payments and slow growth have heavily
contributed to enhancing the weight of debt, developing a dangerous
vicious circle.
However, there are several optimistic forecasts on debt dynamics
(IMF, European Commission, OECD). This is the result of the deep
efforts which have occurred in recent years, in particular since 2012.
The objective of this post  is to discuss the projections of Italian debt
under scenarios simulated by the OECD, IMF and others.
To do this, it is required to understand debt sustainability, analyzing
short concepts about it.
Debt sustainability: a short review
 
Above is the standard equation which describes changing debt-to-GDP
ratio (see Blanchard (2010) or Farmer(1998), Macroeconomics). This
equation states that debt changing is the sum of two terms.
The first represents the difference between real interest rate ( alternatively  ) and rate of growth multiplied for the
outstanding debt. So if the real interest is higher than growth the debt level will increase and vice-versa.
The second term is the primary balance. When public spending is greater than revenue the debt level will rise.
Summarizing, if the rate of growth is lower than the real interest rate, to avoid increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio,
governments need to make the  relevant  primary balance.  Instead, when “g” exceeds “r”,  even with public deficit,
 debt dynamics will be sustainable.
As it will be fairly easy to understand, the last instance does not concern the Italian case. Unfortunately the high
level of interest expenditure and the low growth forces it to obtain positive primary balance.
Figure 1
(The underlying primary budget surplus is now large)
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Since 2012 Italy has improved its fiscal situation  (Figure 1), setting the condition to reverse the debt-to-GDP path
when growth returns (OECD survey, 2015). The budget balance, without interest payments and adjusted for the
cycle, has improved by 4-5% since 2009.
Table 1
The Ministry of Economic and Finance estimates that  structural budget will reach balance in 2017.  If that occurs,
Italy should obtain about 4.2% of the primary structural balance in the same year.
Sustaining this strong fiscal position will depend to a large extent on Italy’s ability to keep the confidence of financial
markets and to secure low risk spreads (see OECD report). The massive program of assets purchased by the ECB
(quantitative easing)  follows this way, boosting upward asset prices and cutting interest. Nevertheless extraordinary
events (Greek insolvency) would lead to “uncharted waters” as warned  by Mario Draghi. It could frustrate QE
inducing interest rate volatility.
Following the OECD, the forecast output gap would close in 2017, so that debt would fall steadily, reaching 60% of
GDP soon after 2030 (Figure 2).
Figure 2
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Also, the IMF (see World Economic Outlook, 2015) assumes a decreasing debt-to-GDP ratio by 2016 (Table 2)
arising from a lower expenditure matched to a growth return.
Table 2
Note: Shaded cells indicate IMF staff estimates. Source: IMF(report for selected countries)
Are forecasts too optimistic?
Two questions undermine these results: Italian ability to improve the efficiency of public spending and the threat of
interest rate volatility (see W.R. Cline Sovereign Debt Sustainability in Italy and Spain: a probabilistic approach or
a summary on VOX).
The spending review estimated (on what it described as conservative assumptions) that the ratio of primary
spending to GDP could be reduced by as much as 2 percentage points by 2016 (Commissario straordinario, 2014).
These are large savings.
Unfortunately the delay to implement reforms ( e.g. public administration’s reform) reduces the amount of savings
estimated. Furthermore the persistent phenomenon of tax evasion (180 billion, 27% of GDP) is not helpful. If growth
turns out to be weaker than expected, the risks of revenue shortfalls and spending overruns will rise.
The second item concerns interest rates’ randomness. It is worthy to note the vulnerability shown in 2011 by the
Italian government (Figure 3).
Figure 3
(10-year government bond yields in Germany, Italy, and Spain)
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Source: W.R: Cline (Sovereign Debt Sustainability in Italy and Spain: A Probabilistic Approach), Datastream
The fear of “Grexit” (Italy have invested 40 billion in Greek debt) could revive the same situation. If Greece misses
the payment, it will be the first developed nation to default to the IMF. After that  European periphery spreads could
widen. A Goldman Sachs analyst guesses around 3.5 and 4 per cent on ten year government bonds of Spain and
Italy respectively (WSJ).
In conclusion, the current stillness does not mean the storm is ended. QE’s effectiveness strongly depends on
upcoming events (above all principal payments due from Greece, Table 3 ). Unforeseen choices by Athens would
upset any scenario considered up to now.
Table 3
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